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COMMENTARY
CO-OPTING COMPASSION: THE FEDERAL
VICTIM'S RIGHTS AMENDMENT
LYNNE HENDERSON*
For several years, Congress has considered a number of proposals to
recommend a Victim's Rights Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States. In 1996, Senators Feinstein' and Kyl2 and Representative
Hyde3 introduced proposed amendments to the Constitution that would
provide certain, variously defined rights to crime victims During Na-
tional Crime Victim's Week in 1997,' the Senate Committee on the Judici-
ary held hearings on the most current proposal, Senate Judiciary Resolu-
tion 6.6 The hearings were then heavily attended by members of victim
advocacy groups supporting its adoption.7 Televised by Cable News Net-
work, the hearings included testimony from numerous groups and indi-
* Professor of Law, Indiana University-Bloomington School of Law. This commentary
was originally given as a lecture at St. Thomas University School of Law on April 17, 1997. I
thank Dean Morrissey, Professors Ross, Horsburgh, Margulies, and the many other faculty and
students who made my visit an enjoyable one, both personally and intellectually. I also thank
Editor-in-Chief Nancy Campiglia and the staff of the St. Thomas Law Review for their patience
and help in turning the lecture into this Commentary. Finally, thanks to Robert Mosteller for his
helpful comment and to Santa Clara University School of Law for all their help and support.
I. Dianne Feinstein (Dem., Cal.).
2. Jon Kyl (Rep., Ariz.).
3. Henry Hyde (Rep., Ill.).
4. See Proposals for a Constitutional Amendment to Provide Rights for Victims of Crime,
Hearing on H.J. Res. 173 and H.J. Res. 174 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th
Cong. 1, 2 (1996). Several draft amendments were circulated in the Senate and House; the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary held hearings on one version on April !1, 1996, and the
House Committee held hearings on a different version on July II, 1996. Yet, another version
was proposed, and its sponsors were initially hopeful it would be adopted by Congress before it
recessed on September 4, 1996. See 142 Cong. Rec. S11999, S12000 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996)
(statement of Sen. Feinstein).
5. National Crime Victims Week ran from April 13-19, 1997. See Richard Warchol, Local
Events to Mark Crime Victims' Week, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 9, 1997, at B2.
6. See A Proposed Constitutional Amendment to Protect Victims of Crime: Hearing on
S.J. Res. 6 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1997) (stating that the
hearings were held on April 16, 1997). On April 28, 1998, the Senate Committee held hearings
on yet another revision, Joint Resolution of March 10, 1998. The Joint Resolution was sup-
ported by thirty-four Senators at that time. Senator Biden has since supported it as well. but the
National Victims Center has dropped its support (personal communication from Maria Gross-
man).
7. See generally id.
580 ST. THOMAS LA WREVIEW [Vol. 10
viduals, the vast majority of whom were in favor of the amendment.8
Additionally, Attorney General Janet Reno appeared and testified in favor
of adopting some form of a victim's rights amendment.9 I was one of the
few to speak against the proposed amendment.'0
As a rape survivor and feminist deeply concerned about violence
against women, you might expect me to say that I wholeheartedly endorse
"victims' rights" and victim's rights amendments. As one who has argued
for empathy and compassion as part of the moral fabric of law, I should be
"for" victims." Indeed, how could anyone oppose "victims' rights?" But
that question masks all the very serious moral, jurisprudential, constitu-
tional, and practical issues raised by the assertion of victim's rights. Rhet-
orically, to negate the assertion of "victims' rights" appears to be callous
and cruel, but one cannot unreflectively support constitutional rights for
victims without running the risk of creating more injustice and harm than
already exists. I make this claim based both on the nature of the proposals
made in the name of victims and on the nature of the very concept of rights
as it is currently applied to victims of crime.
This Commentary will explore some of the jurisprudential and prac-
tical issues by examining the nature of victims' rights and victimization.'
2
8. See generally id.
9. See id. at 40. Attorney General Reno did not specifically endorse S.J. Res. 6, however.
Before she testified, Senator Specter protested Senator Hatch's statement that the Committee
would wait to question Reno about the appointment of an independent counsel to investigate
Democratic fund raising. Specter left the hearings abruptly, after making his objection. Indeed,
after Attorney General Reno spoke, only Senators Kyle, Feinstein, and DeWine remained for the
morning hearings.
10. See id. Donna Edwards, of the National Network Against Domestic Violence, and a
district attorney from Virginia both spoke in opposition to the amendment during the morning
session. See id. at 77. Roger Pilon, of the Cato Institute, originally scheduled to testify in op-
position to the amendment, learned that he would not be allowed to testify on the day of the
hearings. I was told that some members of the Judiciary Committee opposed my appearance on
the "victim's panel," preferring to have me testify on the "law professor's panel." Others re-
sisted my speaking at all, but I was allowed to speak on the victim's panel.
11. See Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1574, 1650-53
(1997) [hereinafter Legality and Empathy]; see also generally Lynne Henderson, The Dialogue
of Heart and Head, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 123 (1988); Lynne Henderson, Authoritarianism and
the Rule of Law, 66 IND. L.J. 379 (1991). Apparently, no matter what the substance of a vic-
tim's rights proposal is, anyone who objects is considered to be "against" victims. It is difficult
to point out the harms that proposals could cause victims as well as the criminal process when
one is so categorized.
12. See generally Robert P. Mosteller, Victims' Rights and the United States Constitution:
An Effort to Recast the Battle in Criminal Litigation, 85 GEO. L.J. 1691, 1714-15 (1997) (giving
other criticisms of the amendment). For other criticisms of the amendment, see Letter from Pro-
fessors Erwin Chemerinsky, Lynne Henderson, and Robert P. Mosteller, Regarding the Pro-
posed Victim's Rights Constitutional Amendment, to Senators Orrin Hatch and Patrick J. Leahy
and Representatives Henry Hyde and John Conyers, Jr. (April 15, 1997), reprinted in A Pro-
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After a brief introduction to the history of victim's rights amendments in
the United States, this Commentary will explore the images in the rhetoric
that lead to unreflective support for victims' rights, then turn to images of
justice and arguments for a particular kind of victims' rights, together with
a critique of that vision. Finally, this Commentary suggests some alterna-
tive approaches and programs that promise to be more helpful to victims of
crime than any constitutional amendment would be.
The growth of advocacy groups for victims of crime in the United
States can be traced back to the late 1970s and early 1980s. 3 Feminist
anti-rape groups were possibly among the first to organize efforts seeking
to improve the situation of crime victims in the courts in the 1970s.14 Also
during the 1970s, legislatures established victim-witness assistance pro-
grams, adopted victim's compensation statutes and restitution require-
ments, and provided for the introduction of victim impact statements at
sentencing hearings. 5 On a national level, however, the founding of
Mothers Against Drunk Driving by Candy Lightner, in 1981, marked the
beginning of successful political and social recognition of victims.' 6 The
election of Ronald Reagan and a turn toward a more conservative, crime-
control model of criminal justice made the "discovery" of the victim as a
symbol to counteract what was seen as over-protection of criminal defen-
dants extremely effective.' 7 As Professor Paul Cassell, a leading advocate
for both state and federal constitutional amendments, has argued, efforts to
amend the Constitution trace back to 1982, during hearings before the
President's Task Force on Victims of Crime." By 1985, the Task Force on
posed Constitutional Amendment to Protect Victims of Crime: Hearing on S.J. Res. 6 Before the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 140 (1997); Letter from Professor Paul Gewirtz
Regarding Proposed Victim's Rights Amendment to the Federal Constitution to Senator Chris-
topher Dodd (June 5, 1996) (on file with author); Letter from Professor Regarding the Proposed
Victim's Rights Constitutional Amendment (Sept. 4, 1996) (on file with author).
13. See Bruce Shapiro, Victims & Vengeance: Why the Victims' Rights Amendment Is a
Bad Idea, NATIoN, Feb. 10, 1997, at 13.
14. See Vivian Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom,
77 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3 (1977) ("[I]t is fitting that the 'rediscovery' of rape should coincide
with the growth of the Women's Movement.... Women have ... played a key role in lobbying
for reforms in the law of rape.") (citations omitted).
15. See Memorandum from Henry J. Hyde, Chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary, to
All Members (July 9, 1996) (on file with author); Lynne Henderson, The Wrongs of Victim's
Rights, 37 STAN. L. REV. 937, 944 (1985) [hereinafter Wrongs of Victim's Rights].
16. See Robin Estrin, MADD Fighting View that Drunken Driving Is No Longer Problem,
SEATrLE TIMES, Aug. 10, 1997, at A7; Wrongs of Victim's Rights, supra note 15, at 950 & n.76.
17. See Terry A. Maroney, Note, The Struggle Against Hate Crime: Movement at a Cross-
roads, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 564, 564, 576 (1998); Wrongs of Victim's Rights, supra note 15, at
951 n.80 and accompanying text.
18. See Paul G. Cassell, Balancing the Scales of Justice: The Case for and the Effects of
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Victims of Crime recommended amending the Constitution to include
"victim's rights."' 9 But, as I noted in 1985, many of the proposals and
victims' rights amendments to state constitutions had less to do with the
real concerns and needs of victims of violent crime than with law en-
forcement and crime control concerns. 20 After a brief flurry of state consti-
tutional amendments and rejections of amendments, by the mid-I 980s, the
push to provide constitutional rights for victims of crime had waned.2'
The explanation for the resurgence of interest in victim's rights
amendments in a number of states by the mid-1990s is unclear. Certainly,
the "rediscovery" of the crime victim is puzzling in a context in which the
media and authorities were decrying "victim identity" and claims of
"victimization" by white women, people of color, and other subordinated
groups, as well as criminal defendants such as battered women, while
society generally seemed to have little compassion or tolerance for vic-
tims.21 One can only speculate that a combination of fear of crime, despite
the fact that crime rates overall appeared to be declining throughout the
1990s, and the continuing influence of conservative crime control, which
led to increasingly harsh laws and longer punishments, left little else for
legislators to do in response to the demand they "do something" about
crime. Those who had wanted constitutional amendments in the name of
crime victims again found receptive political sponsors. State ballot meas-
ures and pressure for a federal amendment increased.24
"Victims' rights" were-and are-used to counter "defendants'
Utah's Victims'Rights Amendment, 1994 UTAH L. REv. 1373, 1381 (1994).
19. See Wrongs of Victim's Rights, supra note 15, at 1021 n.306.
20. See id. at 968.
21. See id. at 945. Legislatures continued to expand statutory legal rights of victims in the
areas of participation in sentencing, restitution, plea bargaining, and related areas. See id. at
944. Further, victims' groups were successful in persuading legislatures and courts to change
substantive laws defining offenses and punishments. See id. at 945.
22. See Alice Koskela, Casenote & Comment, Victim's Rights Amendments: An Irresistible
Political Force Transforms the Criminal Justice System, 34 IDAHO L. REV. 157, 190 nn.5-10
(1997).
23. See Stephanie B. Goldberg, Make room for Daddy, 83 A.B.A. J. 48, 48 (1997); Joan S.
Meier, Notes from the Underground: Integrating Psychological and Legal Perspectives On
Domestic Violence in Theory and Practice, 21 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1295, 1301 (1993).
24. See William G. Kleinknecht, "Victims" Rights Advocates On a Roll, NAT'L L.J., July
15, 1996, at 1, 18; Robert P. Mosteller, Victim's Rights and the Constitution: Moving From
Quaranteeing Participatory Rights to Benefiting the Prosecution, 29 ST. MARY'S L.J. _
(forthcoming) (1998); Robert P. Mosteller, The U.S. Perspective on the Judicial Role in Sentenc-
ing: A Story of Small Victories and a Call for Partial Solutions in a Difficult Environment 14-
16 (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (arguing victims' rights efforts continuos over
time).
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rights" and to trump those rights if possible. In an argument that traces
back to at least the early 20th Century, people accused of crimes are
probably "guilty as sin" and undeserving of so much legal protection. 6
The argument continues that the constitution of a state, or of the United
States, contains specific rights protecting those accused of crimes (and, in
the case of habeas corpus and cruel and unusual punishments, those con-
victed of crimes).27 Victims of crimes, on the other hand, are blameless
innocents far more "deserving" of rights, and they have absolutely no
constitutional rights.2 ' To give criminals rights and deny rights to their
victims appears to be patently unequal, unfair, and unjust. One fallacy in
that argument immediately appears: Victims, as citizens, have many
constitutional rights, regardless of the specific protections for defendants.
More important, it is not clear why it is unfair and unjust for victims of a
particular sort not to have constitutional rights-victims of all sorts of
harms have no specific constitutional rights or remedies for those harms
beyond the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial.29 What, one must ask,
is so "special" about victims of crimes-sometimes limited to victims of
violent crimes, sometimes not? The question of whether only victims of
violent crimes ought to have constitutional rights, as opposed to victims of
all crimes-such as victims of toxic waste dumping violations or of disas-
ters attributable to culpable human negligence-remains unanswered.
To answer the question whether victims should have rights, first one
needs to understand who is included in the term "victim" and who the vic-
tims actually are. Then we need to know what the concerns of those vic-
tims are and what their experience is. Ideally, we also need to know em-
pirically what things help and what things hurt victims recovering from
trauma. Only then can we even begin to formulate laws--or constitutional
25. See Wrongs of Victim's Rights, supra note 15, at 952. The notion that defendant's
rights should be trumped certainly appeared to be a concern of Senator Kyl at the 1997 hearings
and has been voiced by other supporters of the Amendment. See generally A Proposed Consti-
tutional Amendment to Protect Victims of Crime: Hearing on S.J. Res. 6 Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1997). See also Mosteller, supra note 12, at 1693-94,
1697.
26. See generally LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN
HISTORY 449-65 (1993).
27. See U.S. CONST. amends. IV, V, VI, VII, VIII.
28. Much of the literature in support of the Victim's Rights Amendment to the United
States Constitution lists defendant's rights on the one hand and the absence of victim's rights on
the other. Senator Feinstein used a chart listing defendant's constitutional rights on one side and
the lack of victim's rights on the other; the visual imbalance clearly demonstrated the claim.
See A Proposed Constitutional Amendment to Protect Victims of Crime: Hearing on S.J. Res. 6
Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 14 (1997) (statement of Sen. Dianne
Feinstein, Dem., Cal.).
29. See U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
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amendments-that help victims of crimes. Since the supporters of the
amendment most often use the image of victims of violence (usually
homicide), this Commentary will focus on those victims as well.
Popular culture and ideology construct an image of victims and vio-
lence that, tragic and terrifying as it is, is quite limited. "Victims" are
"blameless," innocent, usually attractive, middle class, and white. They
are articulate and sympathetic. The image of victims appears to be con-
fined to victims of particularly brutal homicides, often committed by re-
peat offenders, and the grieving families of those victims. Often the case
is one that seems to justify, at least on a visceral level, imposition of the
death penalty.30 They are innocent tourists murdered by strangers, usually
men of color;3' elderly women mugged;32 clerks or bystanders shot down
in robberies; 3 the grieving families of those killed by drunk drivers with
repeated convictions for driving under the influence;34 or women who are
victims of rapes by strangers lurking in the bushes.35 They are innocent
children such as Megan Kanka, raped and murdered in New Jersey, and
Polly Klaas, raped and murdered in California, by seeming monsters with
prior convictions. 36 They are the child victims of the bombing of the fed-
eral building in Oklahoma City.3 7 To put it bluntly, the vast majority of
victims of violent crime do not fit these images, many failing the tests of
whiteness, innocence, and drama.
In this simple Manichaen rhetoric, to oppose victims' rights is to be-
30. See A Proposed Constitutional Amendment to Protect Victims of Crime: Hearing on
S.J. Res. 6 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 66 (1997) (statement of John
Walsh, host of America's Most Wanted and advocate of victim's rights) [hereinafter Walsh
Statement]. Walsh explicitly used these images in an over-the-top speech before the Judiciary
Committee on April 16, 1997, in which he also attacked battered women's groups and others
who opposed the amendment. See id. at 70. I say over-the-top, not only because he well ex-
ceeded the very short time limit given the witnesses, but also because he used the word
"bullshit" in his oral testimony to describe objections to an amendment. See id.
31. See Associated Press, Robbers Kill Lost Tourist, FLA. TODAY, Feb. 24, 1996, at 8B,
available in 1996 WL 10049767.
32. See Chris Conley, 2 Arrested in Robbery, Rape of Elderly Woman, COM. APPEAL, Feb.
26, 1998, at B1.
33. See generally Executed in Florida, WASH. TiMES, Apr. 1, 1998, at A7
34. See generally Malibu Suspected Drunk Driver Kills 2, Injures 2 in Crash, L.A. TIMES,
Dec. 11, 1997, at B4.
35. See David L. Teibel, Police Seek to Link Rapes Tuesday in '97, TUSCON CITIZEN, Jan.
16. 1998, at 2C.
36. See John H. Boit, Sex Predator Law On Trial: A Patriot Ledger Special Report,
PATRIOT LEDGER (Quincy, Mass.), May 16, 1998, at 1, available in 1998 WL 8087303.
37. See Arnold Hamilton, McVeigh Ordered Held Without Bailfor Trial. A Duty Dreaded
Identifying Blast's Youngest Victims Agonizes Agents, DALLAS MORN. NEWS, Apr. 28, 1995, at
IA.
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tray victims. This emphasis not only overlooks the fact that concentrating
on the interests of individual victims undermines the public concern of
criminal law, procedure, and punishment but also fails to recognize the
fact that the experiences and voices of many crime victims simply do not
fit current ideologies or the politics of crime. Accordingly, many victims
are silenced in the name of giving victims a voice.
Our image of victims from the media and popular culture is skewed
in many other ways. Violence against persons of color is often invisible or
discounted, either because they live in "high crime" communities, and,
therefore, violence is a norm and incidental, or because the victims them-
selves have records, fight back, or are poor.38 For example, at the same
time that the news was filled with the horrors of the "Central Park jogger"
case, a brutal attack on a white woman by a group of young men; 9 Kim-
berly Rae Harbor, a young black single mother, was gang-raped by eight
men and stabbed over one-hundred times in New York.40 That same week,
another African-American woman was also gang-raped and sodomized,
then thrown off the top of a four-story building into an air shaft.4' The
news media did not pay attention to either of these horrific crimes.
Another distortion of who properly is a victim springs from moral
judgments about those who are harmed42-- judgments that may intersect
with racial stereotyping and sex discrimination.43 In 1996, President
Clinton, during a Rose Garden speech endorsing a federal victims' rights
amendment, specifically said: "We sure don't want to give criminals like
gang members, who may be victims of their associates [any rights]."
44
Why is a gang member murdered by another any less entitled to "rights"?
Is the killer less of a murderer because of gang affiliations, or does the
victim's family grieve less? Rape victims continue to be judged for who
they are, where they were, how they were dressed, how they behaved, and
whether they are even victims at all.45 The veracity of a rape victim's re-
port is always in question, fed by publicity of cases in which recantation or
admissions of falsity exist.46 A few battered women may be "true" vic-
38. See generally Kimberld Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity
Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1267 (1991).
39. See id.
40. See id. at 1268 n.84.
41. See id. at 1268.
42. See id. at 1278.
43. See id.
44. Clinton's Announcement in Support of a Victim's Rights Amendment (Online News
Hour, June 25, 1996).
45. See Crenshaw, supra note 38, at 1267-68, 1278-80.
46. See id. at 1268-69.
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tims, but as Donna Edwards of the National Network to End Domestic
Violence noted at the 1997 Senate hearings: "There could be but a day's
difference between the battered woman 'victim' and the battered woman
'defendant."' 47 She asked, "How many battered women are incarcerated
today never having had the opportunity to address the court regarding the
abuse they endured? '48 Under current models of victim's rights and argu-
ments in support of such rights, of course, these women are not victims at
all, they are criminals. 49 If the abused killed the batterer, then the abuser,
or the family of the abuser, automatically becomes the official victim and
has the right to punish the abused-to inflict further pain upon them. 0
Further illustrating the complexity of victimization is the image of the bro-
ken features and broken spirit of Hedda Nussbaum that received wide-
spread publicity in the late 1980s." Nussbaum, who failed to rescue Lisa
Steinberg from Joel Steinberg's violence, is not seen as a victim of Joel
Steinberg's horrific violence but as a morally blameworthy person who
allowed Steinberg to murder an innocent child. 2
The image of certain victims is thus juxtaposed against the image of
defendants and "criminals." Defendants are subhuman; they are monsters.
The criminal is Ted Bundy,53 Lawrence Singleton,
54 Richard Allen Davis,55
47. A Proposed Constitutional Amendment to Protect Victims of Crime: Hearing on S.J.
Res. 6 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 80 (1997) (statement of Donna F.
Edwards, Exec. Dir. Nat'l Network to End Domestic Violence) [hereinafter Edwards Statement].
48. Id.
49. See id.
50. See id. Another point against the amendment, of concern to battered women, is that by
focusing on the victims participation, the amendment places battered women in the shoes of the
prosecution, which could further endanger them. See id. The requirement that a victim provide
law enforcement of her whereabouts in order to receive "notice" may lead to disclosure of a
woman's whereabouts when she is in hiding from her abuser to anyone who might come in
contact with the abuser.
51. See Tamara Jones, The Woman Who Can't Stop Crying, GOOD HOUSEKEEPING, June 1,
1997, at 118, 118.
52. See id.
53. See Associated Press, Bundy Files Archived Boxes of Grisly Photos, Reports and More
On the 1970's Killing Spree Are Being Preserved. But Who Will Get to See Them?, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, Apr. 6, 1998, at A8. Ted Bundy was a law student turned cross-country murderer
whose killing spree during the 1970s spread terror, at first, in Washington and Oregon and later,
in Colorado, Utah, and Florida. See id.
54. See Sue Carlton, Boyfriend: Give Singleton Life, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Fla.), Mar.
31, 1998, at lB. Lawrence Singleton was recently sentenced to die in Florida's electric chair for
stabbing Roxanne Hayes, a thirty-one-year-old prostitute and mother of three, after the jury
learned of his criminal past. See id. Twenty years ago, Singleton picked up a fifteen-year-old
California hitchhiker, named Mary Vincent, raped her, chopped off her arms with an ax, and left
her for dead. See id.
55. See generally DAVID C. ANDERSON, CRIME AND THE POLITICS OF HYSTERIA: HOW THE
WILLIE HORTON CASE CHANGED AMERICAN JUSTICE (1995); Dorine Bethea, Survivors of Vio-
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Willie Horton 6-- criminals who seem to be the very embodiment of evil.
Alternatively, the image of the criminal is the ominous, if undifferentiated,
poor, angry, violent, Black, or Latino male. 7 The acquittal in the criminal
prosecution of O.J. Simpson,5 8 an African-American who was trans-
formed from "nice guy" to a complete-and dark-faced-monster, pro-
vided further fuel for the argument against defendant's rights (especially
the right to a jury trial).59
The popular image of the "criminal" certainly does not include a
white fraternity member who participates in the gang-rape of a young
woman he knows, 60 or a successful businessman loved by the community
who just happens to beat his wife,6' or another prominent citizen who
stabbed his wife multiple times.62 Something happened which caused
these ordinary, nice men to snap, temporarily losing control.63 These men
are not criminals. They are us and deserving of sympathy and compassion
or at least some understanding of their plight.
"True" victims must remain always innocent and righteously angry at
the same time. The rhetoric and images of victims' rights proponents ig-
nore the effects of violence on the victims themselves, and those effects
include victims becoming perpetrators as a result of their experiences.r6
lence Share from Lessons Learned, RIC-MOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Mar. 18, 1998, at M5. Rich-
ard Allen Davis is the man convicted on abduction, kidnapping, and murder charges in the death
of Polly Klaas in California. See Bethea, supra.
56. See generally Gerald Belier, The Great Divide: Political Rhetoric, Government Policies
Turning the U.S. into a Moral Minefield, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Mar. 2, 1998, at 5A. Willie
Horton was a black man who raped a white woman and stabbed her husband while on furlough
from a Massachusetts prison. See id.
57. See generally Patricia Williams, Spirit-Murdering the Messenger: The Discourse of
Fingerpointing as the Law's Response to Racism, 42 U. MIAMI L. REv. 127, 155 (1987).
58. People v. Simpson, No. BA097211, 1995 WL 704381, at *1 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 3,
1995).
59. See generally Leonard M. Baynes, A Time to Kill, The O.J. Simpson Trials, and Story-
telling to Juries, 17 Loy. LA. ENT. L.J. 549, 553 (1997).
60. The acquittal of fraternity members in the St. John's case is an example. See Lynne
Henderson, Rape and Responsibility, 11 L. & PHIL. 127, 151-53 (1992). The Spur Posse case,
in which the defendants had a point system for achieving sex with underage girls, resulted in no
prosecutions; the boys' conduct was proudly characterized by some of their parents as "virile,"
etc. See Michelle Oberman, Turning Girls into Women: Re-Evaluating Modern Statutory Rape
Law, 85 J. CRIM L. & CRIMINOLOGY 15, 15 nn.1, 2 (1994).
61. See Jerry Carroll, Days of Wine and Treachery: Saratoga Author Follows Gallo Fam-
ily's Trail in Tale ofArrogance, Deceit and Murder, SAN FRAN. CHRON., Mar. 12, 1993, at B3.
62. See Husband Describes Stabbing- Peter Horbury, TIMES OF LONDON, Nov. 22, 1992,
available in WL 10913273.
63. See Charlton Man Allegedly Stabs Wife to Death with Kitchen Knife, BOS. HERALD,
Jan. 6, 1998, at 10.
64. See generally Elizabeth L. Turk, Note, Abuses and Syndromes: Excuses or Justifica-
tions?, 18 WHITTIER L. REv. 901, 901-03.
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Those who are affected by the extreme trauma of violent crime, who then
end up killing or harming others, are said to be hiding from their moral
obligations, rather than deserving of some compassion for the circum-
stances that led them to strike out. 5
Generally, victim status is narrowly framed by law.6 A defendant
who has been the victim of extreme and horrible violence and who then
kills, as in many battered women's self-defense cases, 67 or participates in a
robbery, as Patricia Hearst68 did during her ordeal, is criticized by the me-
dia and commentators for trying to avoid moral responsibility.6 9 Bernhard
Goetz, the "subway vigilante," 70 and the Menendez brothers, who mur-
dered their parents, 7' become the argument against evidence of prior
trauma as a defense to assault,7 2 perhaps because the Goetz case is so diffi-
cult to sympathize with for many, 73 and because the Menendez brothers
appeared to be opportunistically using their father's abuse of them as chil-
dren.74 Commentators, including Alan Dershowitz, George Fletcher,
James Q. Wilson,75 and Anne Coughlin, mock "the abuse excuse" as a
manipulative ploy by wrongdoers to avoid individual moral responsibility
and free choice.76 Despite the growing evidence correlating histories of
65. See id.
66. See Lynne Henderson, Fletcher, With Justice for Some: Victims' Rights in Criminal
Trials; Whose Justice? Which Victims?, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1596, 1601-02 (1996) [hereinafter
Whose Justice?].
67. See generally Martha R. Mahony, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the
Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 83-93 (1991).
68. See Malcom Glover, Baylife 98: Past, Present and Future, SAN FRAN. EXAMINER,
Mar. 1, 1998, at WIl.
69. See Arthur J. Lurigio et al., Child Sexual Abuse: Its Causes, Consequences, and Impli-
cations for Probation Practice, FED. PROBATION, Sept. 1995, at 69, 69.
70. See Turk, supra note 64, at 910-11.
71. See ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, THE ABUSE EXCUSE: AND OTHER COP-OUTS, SOB
STORIES, AND EVASIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY 21 (1994).
72. See Robert P. Mosteller, Syndromes and Politics in Criminal Trials and Evidence Law,
46 DUKE L.J. 461, 462 (1988); see also David M. Posner, Note, The Proper Standard for Self-
Defense in New York: Should People v. Goetz Be Viewed as Judicial Legislation or Judicial
Restraint?, 39 SYRACUSE L. REV. 845, 87 1-72 (1988).
73. George Fletcher uses both of these cases as examples of the "slippery slope" in With
Justice for Some. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, WITH JUSTICE FOR SOME: VICTIMS' RIGHTS IN
CRIMINAL TRIALS 140-48, 187-88 (1995). But see Peter Margulies, Identity on Trial: Subordi-
nation Social Science Evidence, and Criminal Defense (1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author).
74. DERSHOWITZ, supra note 71; see also Posner, supra note 72, at 845.
75. See generally JAMES Q. WILSON, MORAL JUDGMENT (1997).
76. See generally DERSHOWITZ, supra note 71; FLETCHER, supra note 73; Anne M. Cough-
lin, Excusing Women, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1, 1 (1994). See also Whose Justice?, supra note 66
(reviewing Fletcher).
1998] THE FEDERAL VICTIM'S RIGHTS AMENDMENT 589
abuse and neglect-victimization-with violence in later life,77 there is no
"bad childhood" defense.78 Sure, we all had it rough. In fact, prosecutors
routinely argue that evidence of the horrific abuse suffered by those who
commit terrible murders is not true "mitigating evidence" in a capital case,
because the law does not allow earlier victimization and its effects on the
human personality as an explanations or as a reason for compassion.
79
The foregoing images and beliefs overlook the profound effects of
violent victimization on the human personality." Yet, anyone who claims
to care for or have compassion for victims of crime would do well to turn
away from rhetoric and the surface images provided by the media in order
to understand the effects of extreme trauma, both for themselves and for
others. Violent crimes-sexual assault, robbery, kidnapping, assault, bat-
tering, attempted murder, and murder-threaten our very lives. They not
only threaten and deny the victim's integrity or personhood, they threaten
the victim's very life. Such encounters can cause a number of psychologi-
cal, social, economic, and spiritual harms to the individual or her survi-
vors.
Confrontation with death is a profound experience; confrontation
with violent crime dispels our comfortable belief that we will not die-at
least not at any time soon. Even if only for a short time, the confrontation
can shatter the sense of invulnerability, divine protection, control, auton-
omy, and meaning we rely on. Rage and terror or dread are common re-
sponses, as are numbing and denial. 8' Anger and fear of death can lead to
fear of revictimization and feelings of helplessness, hopelessness, and de-
spair.82 As one's sense of security in the world is at least temporarily
shattered, so too is one's faith in oneself, others, and one's God. Survivors
may conclude that life owes them something or that they are guilty for
surviving.83 Feelings of, and sensitivity to, betrayal may occur as one's
sense of trust is diminished. 84
It is against this background that the push for "rights" for victims oc-
curs, often with little acknowledgment of the actual effects of victimiza-
77. See Robin A. Rosencrantz, Rejecting "Hear No Evil Speak No Evil": Expanding the
Attorney's Role in ChildAbuse Reporting, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 327, 338-39 (1994).
78. See DERSHOWITZ, supra note 71, at 18, 19.
79. See Welsh S. White, Capital Punishment's Future, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1429, 1434-35
(1993).
80. See JUDITH LEWIS HERMAN, TRAUMA AND RECOVERY 33,51 (1992).
81. See id. at 50; see also Wrongs of Victim's Rights, supra note 15, at 959.
82. See HERMAN, supra note 80, at 34.
83. See Paul Gerwitz, Victims and Voyeurs at the Criminal Trial, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 863,
882-83 (1996).
84. See Shapiro, supra note 13, at 11, 18.
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tion on individuals and those close to them. To the extent that we feel
compassion and sympathy for the anguish of victims, we are justified in
attempting to respond to their plight. But all too often, the compassion for
a victim's suffering transforms into attacks on the criminal justice process
and "criminals," rather than inquiring into how we can help victims to re-
cover and heal. The current trend towards encouraging victims to be rage-
ful overlooks all but a part of the process of living after trauma.
As I observed earlier, since the original victim's rights movement
began, there has been a move towards harsher and longer punishments for
convicted offenders. The "Three Strikes You're Out" laws, 5 the sexual
predator laws, 6 the lengthening of punishment under determinant sentenc-
ing,s7 and congressional expansion of offenses punishable by death," all
manifest the turn to a heavily punitive response to crime. Prosecutors use
victim impact statements in capital cases to promote hatred of the offender
for what he did to the victim and the victim's family; the prosecution ex-
ploits the family's grief and rage to ensure execution.89 A striking example
of this selective use of "victim impact" evidence was provided by Marilyn
Kight, mother of a little girl killed in the Oklahoma City bombing case.90
Kight, a supporter of the proposed Victim's Rights Amendment, testified
before the Senate Judiciary Committee in 1997 that the prosecutors in the
85. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(e)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1998). "Three Strikes You're
Out" is a popular term used to describe the recidivist legislation that calls for the incarceration
of a violent criminal for life upon a third felony conviction. See Franklin Zimring, Populism,
Democratic Government, and the Decline of Expert Authority: Some Reflections on "Three
Strikes" in California, 28 PAC. L.J. 243 (1996). See R. Daniel O'Connor, Note, Defining the
Strike Zone-An Analysis of the Classification of Prior Convictions Under the Federal "Three-
Strikes and You're Out" Scheme, 36 B.C. L. REV. 847, 847 (1995); Nkechi Taifa, "Three-
Strikes-and-You 're-Out"--Mandatory Life Imprisonment for Third Time Felons, 20 U. DAYTON
L. REV. 717, 717 (1994).
86. See Heather M. Steams, Stalking Stuffers: A Revolutionary Law to Keep Predators
Behind Bars, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1027, 1042 (1995).
87. See Stuart Nagel & Kathleen Levy, The Average May Be the Optimum in Determinate
Sentencing, 42 U. PITT. L. REV. 583, 585 (1981); Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the
Wake of the Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J.
1681 (1992).
88. See Spencer J. Crona & Neal A. Richardson, Justice for War Criminals of Invisible
Armies: A New Legal and Military Approach to Terrorism, 21 OKLA. CITY. U. L. REV. 349, 388
(1996).
89. See Carrie L. Mulholland, Sentencing Criminals: The Constitutionality of Victim Im-
pact Statements. 60 MO. L. REv. 731, 746-47 (1995); Sysan Bandes, Empathy, Narrative, and
Victim Impact Statements, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 361, 361-62 (1996); Bruce Ledewitz & Scott Sta-
ples, No Punishment Without Cruelty, 4 GEO. MASON U. Civ. RTs. L.J. 41, 54 (1993); Robert P.
Mosteller, The Effect-Impact Evidence of the Defense, 8 CRIM. JUST. 24, 29 (1993).
90. See A Proposed Constitutional Amendment to Protect Victims of Crime: Hearing on
S.J. Res. 6 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary United States, 105th Cong. 70 (1997)
(statement of Marsha A. Kight) [hereinafter Kight Statement].
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Timothy McVeigh case 9' told her that she would not be allowed to give a
statement at the penalty phase should McVeigh be convicted, because she
opposes the death penalty.92 Kight recently received "permission" to tes-
tify at the sentencing of Terry Nichols, an accomplice of McVeigh's who
was convicted of conspiracy and manslaughter by a federal jury, how-
ever.
93
The arguments in favor of a victims' rights and the Federal Amend-
ment appear to recognize the rage of victims almost exclusively, channel-
ing that anger into an attack on judges, defense lawyers, and defendants. 94
There is some concern with fear, as well; the provisions for preventive de-
tention and continued custody seem to seek to allay a victim's fear that the
perpetrator will retaliate against her.95 The main focus in the arguments
and literature has been on anger rather than fear, however; the remainder
of this Commentary will be concerned with analyzing the use of anger and
related emotions by groups, the media, and scholars.
Individual victims and victims' groups supporting punitive responses
to crime have the public and legislative ear;96 those that do not are ignored.
For example, the media quoted Kight as angrily denouncing the verdict in
the Nichols case without noting her opposition to capital punishment.97 No
representatives from Murder Victim's Families for Reconciliation, a group
that opposes the death penalty,9 were called as witnesses against the pro-
posed Victim's Rights Amendment.99 Bruce Shapiro's exploration of vic-
tim advocacy groups, chronicled in his Commentary in The Nation, also
91. United States v. McVeigh, 931 F. Supp. 756 (D. Colo. 1996).
92. See Kight Statement, supra note 90, at 70-71.
93. Jo Thomas, Leniency Possible ifNichols Helps Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1998, at
Al.
94. See Shapiro. supra note 13, at 11, 13; see also Wrongs of Victim's Rights, supra note
15, at 997.
95. See Wrongs of Victim's Rights, supra note 15, at 968-71. 1 am indebted to Paul Brest
for pointing this out. The terror and fear victims experience is real; but to the extent that pre-
ventive detention and continued custody are justified, it is in terms of revenge and an image of
offenders as monsters who will commit horrible crimes if released, rather than specific victim
fears of retaliation.
96. See Shapiro, supra note 13, at 12, 16.
97. Professor Steven Schulhofer told me that Kight had said she was misquoted by the pa-
pers. See Conversation with Steven Schulhofer, Professor of Law (Jan. 6, 1998). See also Helen
Kennedy, Nichols Escapes Death Jurors Let Judge Decide Penalty, N.Y. DAILY NEws, Jan. 8,
1998, at 9, available in 1998 WL 5915906.
98. See Shapiro, supra note 13, at 19.
99. See generally A Proposed Constitutional Amendment to Protect Victims of Crime:
Hearing on S.. Res. 6 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1997). The
group did, however, submit a prepared statement. See id. at 160 (statement of Murder Victims'
Families for Reconciliation).
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notes the focus of the groups on anger and retribution. °0
Victims' rights presently appear to focus almost entirely on an indi-
vidual's right to have an offender swiftly punished, with the punishment
based on revenge and incapacitation, despite the restitution provision, and
the victim's right to use the apparatus of the state to accomplish that ob-
jective.'0 ' The Federal Amendment proposed by Senate Judiciary Resolu-
tion 6 would give rights to victims of violent crimes and any other crime
defined by Congress, in juvenile, collateral (habeas corpus), and military
proceedings in all federal and state courts.0 2 The Constitution would give
such victims the right to notice and to attendance at all public proceedings
"relating to the crime"'0 3 and:
(1) to be heard and to submit written statements at proceedings in-
volving release from custody, acceptance of a plea bargain, or sentenc-
ing;104
(2) to be heard and submit written statements at public parole;0 5
(3) to notice of release on parole or escape;
0 6
(4) "[t]o a final disposition of the proceedings relating to the crime
free from unreasonable delay;"'
07
(5) "[t]o an order of restitution from the convicted offender;"' '
(6) "[t]o consideration for the safety of the victim in determining any
release from custody." ' 9
These rights must be enforced by Congress and the states, unless
"compelling reasons of public safety or for judicial efficiency in mass vic-
tim cases" requires an "exception."'' 0 Although the amendment would be
unique in creating positive constitutional rights requiring government to do
something rather than refrain from interfering with liberties, it specifically
excludes a number of remedies victims would have for violation of their
rights. Section 2 of the proposal specifically provides that victims cannot
sue state actors for damages for violations of their rights and that victims
would have no grounds for challenging a charging decision, a conviction,
100. See Shapiro, supra note 13, at 12, 18, 19.
101. See id. at 13.
102. See S.J. Res. 6, 105th Cong. § 5 (1997).






109. Id. (emphasis added).
110. Id. at. § 3.
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an order obtaining a stay of a trial, or a decision compelling a new trial."'
The restitution provision as a constitutional right could be meaningless as
well if the offender is poor or judgment proof, which many are. Moreover,
the restitution provision as a constitutional right might "trump" the impo-
sition or recovery of other criminal fines, which currently fund victims'
compensation and assistance programs.
The focus of this amendment seems to be largely on imprisoning of-
fenders before they are convicted and on imprisoning them for as long as
possible or executing them as quickly as possible upon conviction."
2
Furthermore, these proposals appear to rest on assumptions about victims
desiring both swift convictions and the power to determine punishments.'
This is not the only interpretation of the amendment to be sure, but it is
one that is consistent with the rhetoric, the images used to promote the
amendment, and the turn to retributive rationales.
Images of what constitutes justice in the criminal law are largely de-




Therefore, justice requires punishment of the guilty. From the viewpoint
of corrective justice-righting a past wrong" 5-- crime and punishment are
correlatives:1 6 The only just remedy for crime is punishment-the inten-
tional infliction of physical and psychic harm on the wrongdoer. This
view raises a troubling question--does justice require that punishment be
inflicted because the wrong is to society, the individual victim, the moral
order, or something or someone else?
Corrective justice does not necessarily demand punishment, although
social practice and retributivist philosophers assert that crime and punish-
ment are justice, needing no further justification." 7 Kant maintained that
punishment for crime is right-in-itself, that it is fitting to punish the guilty,
and that justice requires punishment."8 Modem sophisticated theories of
111. Id.at§2.
112. See Shapiro, supra note 13, at 13.
113. See Mosteller, supra note 12, at 1696.
114. See Paul H. Robinson, Reforming the Federal Criminal Code: A Top Ten List, I BUFF.
CRuM. L. REV. 225, 265 (1997).
115. See Gerald J. Postema, Risks, Wrongs, and Responsibility: Coleman's Liberal Theory
of Commutative Justice, 103 YALE L.J. 861, 875 (1993) (reviewing JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS
AND WRONGS (1992)).
116. See, e.g., Matthew H. Kramer, Of Aristotle and Ice Crime Cones: Reflections on Jules
Coleman's Theory of Corrective Justice, 16 QuINNIPIAc L. REV. 279, 283 (1996).
117. See FLETCHER, supra note 76, at 202-03; Robert Blecker, Haven or Hell? Inside Lorton
Central Prison: Experiences of Punishment Justified, 42 STAN. L. REv. 1149, 1164-65 (1990).
118. See Brian J. Telpner, Constructing Safe Communities: Megan's Laws and the Purposes
of Punishment, 85 GEO. L.J. 2039, 2056 (1997); see FLETCHER, supra note 73, at 202.
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moral retribution growing out of a Kantian definition of justice include
Herbert Morris' argument that the offender consciously chooses to do
wrong and that in doing so also chooses to be punished for the wrong." 9
Just deserts require punishment in order to restore the moral balance of
society.'2 °
These and similar arguments focus on the moral worth of the of-
fender and the community's right to punish him or her; they do not depend
on an individual's right to have the offender punished or any right to re-
venge. 121 Indeed, these justifications for retributive punishment do not ar-
gue for the punishment of the guilty as duty owed to the individual victim
or right belonging to the victim; rather, they argue in terms of the duty and
right of the state and community to punish.
In the 1980s, with the revival of interest in retributivist theories of
justice and the victim's rights movement,' 2 philosophers began to shift to
arguments that vengeance and hatred were proper grounds for punish-
ment. 23 Revenge, long discredited by philosophers and social scientists as
unenlightened, was rehabilitated as a justification for inflicting pain on an
individual. 124 Retaliatory retribution-retribution for its own sake and for
emotional "release"--became respectable. 125 While the new vengeance-
based justifications for punishment first concentrated on society's interest
in revenge,12 a number of serious philosophers began to frame retaliatory
retributive arguments in terms of individual victims.
27
Perhaps the most well-known and thoughtful arguments framing ret-
ribution in terms of the individual victim are those made by philosophers
Jeffrie Murphy and Jean Hampton in their book, Forgiveness and Mercy.
119. See Jeffrie G. Murphy, The State's Interest in Retribution, 5 J. CONTEMP. LEG. ISSUES
283, 289-90 (1994); see generally FREEDOM AND REsPoNsiBiLiTy (Herbert Moris ed.,1961).
120. See Murphy, supra note 119, at 290.
121. See Rebecca Dresser, Personal Identity and Punishment, 70 B.U. L. REV. 395, 420
(1990); Tamar Frankel, Comment, Lessons From the Past: Revenge Yesterday and Today, 76
B.U. L. Rev. 89, 90, 92 (1996).
122. See Susan Bandes, Empathy, Narrative, and Victim Impact Statements, 63 U. CHI. L.
REV. 361, 396-98 (1996); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Law: What Role Vengeance?, BOS. GLOBE,
June 8, 1997, at DI; Carol Mansur, Payne v. Tennessee: The Effect of Victim Harm at Capital
Sentencing Trials and the Resurgence of Victim Impact Statement, 27 NEW ENG. L. REV. 713,
715 (1993).
123. See R.A. Duff, Penal Communications: Recent Work in the Philosophy of Punishment,
20 CRIM. JUST. 28, 28 (1996).
124. See Frankel, supra note 121, at 97.
125. Id. at 100.
126. See Robert F. Schopp, Wake Up and Die Right: The Rationale, Standard, and Juris-
prudential Significance of the Competency to Face Execution Requirement, 51 LA. L. REV. 995,
1006 (1991).
127. See Frankel, supra note 121, at 98.
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Murphy argues that violent crime inflicts indignity on and denies the very
personhood of the victim. 128 The purpose of punishment is to affirm the
victim's worth and to balance the moral value of the victim against that of
the accused.'29 Thus, it is the individual who has a right to have the
wrongdoer punished as an affirmation of her moral worth. In Murphy's
view, victims have the "right to hate" and should hate the offender. 30 The
only proper or moral response on the part of the victim is anger, resent-
ment, and hatred. Accordingly, victims have the right to inflict pain on
their assailants-or, at least they have the right to use the state to inflict
pain. Hampton argues against hatred and resentment,' following a more
classic moral retributivist argument, 132 but she agrees that the moral value
of the victim must be reaffirmed by punishment. 33 While both authors
make strong, if different, arguments for retribution as the moral basis of
punishment, mercy receives hardly any attention, and neither author is
very clear on the morality of forgiveness. Murphy seemingly relegates
forgiveness and mercy to Jesus Christ and the saints; 3 4 Hampton appears
to suggest that forgiveness is akin to an act of grace at some point but also
argues that certain moral requirements must be met by an offender to jus-
tify forgiveness.
3 1
Similar to Murphy, Robert Solomon, in Passion for Justice, argues
that injustice produces anger in its victims. 136 Solomon joins the social
interest in punishment with the individual's rights and well-being to assert
"the ready willingness to retaliate provides stability to both the social sys-
tem and one's personal sense of integrity and control.' 37 Violent crime is
unjust, and victims properly feel anger and resentment. Resentment, the
recognition that someone is better off as the result of injustice or commit-
ting a wrong against one, begins with the personal emotions of anger and
bitterness. Anger and resentment, in turn, give rise to the need for action,
which is vengeance. According to Solomon, criminal assault is an injus-
tice that produces anger, which in turn leads to resentment and then to re-
128. See JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JEAN HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 14, 28 (1988).
129. See id. at 16.
130. See id.
131. Seeid. at35, 38, 65.
132. See id. at 103, 143-44.
133. See id. at 126-27. Despite its title, the book gives mercy or compassion short shrift, and
it highly qualifies the proper circumstances for forgiveness. See generally id.
134. Seeid. at31.
135. See id. at 37-38. 86.
136. See ROBERT C. SOLOMON, A PASSION FOR JUSTICE: EMOTIONS AND THE ORIGINS OF
THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 247 (1990).
137. Id. at 286.
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taliation' 38 "When current criminal law reduces the victim of such crimes
to a mere bystander (if, that is, the victim has survived the crime), the
problem is not that.., without vengeance justice seems not only to be
taken out of our hands but eliminated as a consideration altogether."'
' 3
"Wrongdoing should be punished, and, especially, those who have
wronged us should be punished, preferably by us or, at least, in our
name."
140
Solomon argues that the impulse to "get even" is an important in-
gredient of justice that has been wrongly ignored and misrepresented in
philosophy.' As vengeance is at the very core of our sense of justice, he
argues that "[t]he desire for vengeance is our natural need for retribu-
tion,' ' 4 any account of justice must include a role for vengeance. 4 3 Here,
of course, Solomon may be committing the naturalistic fallacy, mistaking
an "is" for an "ought": He argues that because people feel anger and seek
revenge at being hurt or upon suffering injustice, it is a part of justice to
act out that anger in punishing those whom we perceive as the source of
hurt or injustice."
In the current climate of disdain for "victim identity" or claims of
victimization, Solomon suggests that only through revenge do we shed the
dreaded victim identity by eschewing forgiveness or compassion for those
who hurt us: "But we do not have to see ourselves as victims, and it is
vengeance or at least fantasies of vengeance that make this possible.
... [C]ompassion for one's own offender (for the object of one's revenge)
is often foolish rather than noble."' 45 For Solomon's justice, the "natural"
emotions of resentment and revenge, if tempered at all, are tempered by an
awareness of selfishness or pettiness, a kind of rearrangement of priorities.
That urges to retaliate, revenge fantasies, and actual retaliation exist
in our culture does not make them right or moral. To question the validity
of vengeance, one need only think of the endless feuding produced by "tit-
for-tat" revenge that occurs historically and daily throughout the world.
Despite his tendency to state that certain emotions, feelings, and actions
138. See generally id. at 246-63.
139. Id. at 277-78.
140. Id. at 272.
141. See id. at279.
142. Id.
143. See id. at 285, 286.
144. See id. at 272-73.
145. See generally id. at 286. He goes on to state that "Justice is not forgiveness nor even
forgetting but rather it is getting one's emotional priorities right, putting blame aside [not be-
cause it isn't deserving but] in the face of so much other human suffering and thereby giving up
vengeance for the sake of larger and more noble emotions." Id.
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are "natural" parts of justice, Solomon does not accept these "natural"
manifestations. Instead, he both excludes blood feuds, vendettas, and hor-
rific punishments from his concept of vengeance and notes that compas-
sion for others has a role to play in justice, at least at certain times.46
Is the focus on anger and revenge a good or compassionate response
to victims of violent crime? Is it morally right to urge victims to resent and
hate? Does it help their healing and their individual dignity and autonomy?
I think dwelling exclusively on resentment is damaging, although denying
anger is also damaging to victims of extreme trauma. Anger is frequently
one of the emotions experienced by victims-anger at the offender, anger
at themselves, anger at others, anger at actors in the criminal justice sys-
tem, and anger at the world are understandable and likely reactions. But
anger can dissipate over time or play a different role at different times in
an individual's recovery from violence. Just as it is not compassionate to
tell someone not to be angry, or to forgive and forget a horrific experience,
or to put it behind them, to urge them to dwell upon hatred and revenge to
the exclusion of all other emotions is damaging. It is particularly harmful
and immoral to urge anger for ulterior, instrumentalist motives--e.g., to
increase punishments, to foster society's retaliatory response, and, perhaps,
to increase conviction rates.
First, urging victims to dwell upon anger freezes the healing process
into one emotion; it rewards that emotion and ignores all the others. It in-
sists that victims and law ought to embody, encourage, and act upon
rage. 47 Anger and resentment become the good and thejust. Putting aside
the fact that taking revenge may not always be morally proper, encourag-
ing victims to nurse resentment overlooks the danger that resentment is
poisonous to well-being and happiness, as well as damaging to recovery,
because it deflects attention from the other issues of meaning, isolation,
death anxiety, and responsibility that victimization raises. And emotions
of terror and grief often exist for survivors of violent crimes or extreme
trauma, and these emotions ought not go unrecognized in service to an-
ger. 48 If those emotions are "wrong," they are overlooked and unhealed;
they may masquerade as "rage" rather than the core emotion, or the victim
may feel worse because she or he does not have the "proper" emotions.
149
Emotions of pity or compassion for offenders, by becoming forbidden as
146. See id. at 285-86.
147. However, even the Supreme Court of the United States has held that rage in sentencing
is inappropriate. See Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 508-09 (1987).
148. See HERMAN, supra note 80, at 25, 33 (explaining the effects of psychological trauma).
149. See MALE VICTIMS OF SEXUAL ASSAULT 101-02 (Gillian C. Mezey & Michael B. King
eds., 1992); see also CATHY ROBERTS, WOMEN AND RAPE 101-02, 131-32 (1989).
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"improper," may exacerbate the impulse to rageful violence which under-
lies so many violent crimes already. 50
The emphasis on anger-resentment-hatred is powerfully gendered as
well. Images of proper responses to victimhood in the media are often re-
duced to the angry male identity of the rageful Fred Goldman and Mark
Klaas.' 5' Ron Goldman's mother-does anyone even know her name?-
and whatever her emotions, is lost to view and has no voice. 52 Klaas' rage
at Richard Allen Davis' monstrous killing of his daughter received wide
coverage, 53 including Klaas' raging at the jury for taking hours to deter-
mine guilt.54 Mrs. Martin, the girl's mother, remained invisible and un-
heard. 
55
Anger is a "male" emotion in this culture; anger may also be one of
the few emotions men are culturally permitted to express. 156 On the other
hand, females are told not to express anger; epithets abound which reflect
attitudes towards women's expressions of anger and resistance--"shrew"
and "witch" are some milder examples. 57 Many females in this culture-
of all colors and sexual orientations-learn that anger is a "bad" emotion
for a girl or woman to have. For example, to dissuade identification with
feminism, note the use of "man-hating" and "angry" as almost automatic
pejorative adjectives modifying the word "feminist." '58 For a feminist or
an African-American woman to be angry is automatically to become a
150. See SHARON LAMB, THE TROUBLE WITH BLAME: VICTIMS, PERPETRATORS, AND
RESPONSiBiLITy 26-30 (1996); HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CoNDITION 240-41 (1958).
151. See George P. Fletcher, Victim's Rights and Wrongs, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1996, at
E15 ("The father of Polly Klaas stood up in a California courtroom... and vented his rage at
his daughter's killer.... Klaas said [the defendant] should be condemned to Hitler's circle in
hell."); see also Marc Sandalow, Goldman Crusades for Victims'Rights Amendment, SAN FRAN.
CHRON., Apr. 15, 1997, at A3.
152. See Goldman, Ex-Wife to Split Simpson Damages, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 20, 1997, at 9
(stating that Sharon Rufo is Ron Goldman's ex-wife); see also B. Drummond Ayres, Jr., Jury
Decides Simpson Must Pay $25 Million in Punitive Award, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1997, at Al.
153. See Fletcher, supra note 151; see also Harriet Chiang, Goldman's Family Visits S.F. On
Book-Selling Tour, SAN FRAN. CHRON., Feb. 28, 1997, at A21.
154. See, e.g., Tim Golden, Jury Recommends Death for Killer of Polly Klaas, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 6, 1996, at A8 ('Jurors deliberated four days").
155. See Jane Gross, California Town Mourns Abducted Girl, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1993, at
A12.
156. See Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE
L.J. 1545,1576 &n.142 (1991).
157. See id.
158. See ROSEMARIE SKAINE, POWER AND GENDER: ISSUES IN SEXUAL DOMINANCE AND
HARASSMENT 4 (1996); see also Lanae Holbrook, Justice Barkett's Feminist Jurisprudence, 46
U. MIAMI L. REv. 1161, 1168 (1992); Susanne Baer, A Different Approach to Jurisprudence?
Feminisms in German Legal Science, Legal Cultures, and the Ambivalence of Law, 3 CARDOZO
WOMEN'S L.J. 251, 282 (1996).
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stereotype that leads to being less, not more, empowered. 5 9
While anger is relegated to males, fear is denied them, but it is al-
lowed for women. 6 ' Accordingly, females of all social classes and many
ethnic groups are likely to react to violence with fear or terror. Men are
not supposed to cry, but women can, so females are also more likely to
manifest sadness and grief.161 Women are also expected by others to be
caring, compassionate, and forgiving.162 For example, the image of mari-
anisma in Latino/a culture teaches the "ethic of care" that attaches to mid-
dle class girls and women. 63 But the rush to forgive can be damaging be-
cause, like the imposition of the caretaking role on women generally, it
denies women the right to deal with the many feelings, including those of
anger, that come from experiencing violence.' 64 The anger does not neces-
sarily produce the impulse for vengeance, however.
Many women may very well be angry but not-any more than many
men-choose to nurse resentment and hatred. They may be furious with
sexual violence and violence against women. Much of rape and domestic
violence reform came from feminist anger at the law's failure to take these
forms of violence seriously,' 65 which fits the Solomon model of anger as a
signal emotion of injustice. 16 But punishment and punitive responses may
not have been the goal as much as better treatment of rape survivors and
deterring rape. That is, prevention and deterrence instead of retaliation
may be the goal of many concerned who are angry about violence against
women.
The focus on anger-resentment-punishment may be particularly dam-
aging to women of color.167 Angry African-American women are frighten-
159. See Grillo, supra note 156, at 1579, 1580.
160. See THE ENCYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOLOGY 195 (Rom Harr6 & Roger Lamb
eds., 1983).
161. See id.; see also Jeffrey Kauffman, Intrapsychic Dimensions of Disenfranchised Grief,
in DISENFRANCHISED GRIEF: RECOGNIZING HIDDEN SORROW 27 (Kenneth J. Doka ed., 1989)
("The first type of situation in which grief may be disenfranchised by one's own shame is where
one is ashamed of one's own emotions.").
162. See LAMB, supra note 150, at 34-35.
163. GRAN DICCIONARIO ESPAROL-INGLES/ENGLISH-SPANISH DICTIONARY 447 (Larousse
1993) (the word derives from "Marian" of the Virgin Mary).
164. See, e.g., LAMB, supra note 150, at 160-66; MURPHY & HAMPTOM, supra note 128, at
15-19.
165. See generally HERMAN, supra note 80, at 28-31; see also FLETCHER, supra note 73, at
4.
166. See SOLOMON, supra note 136, at 201-02.
167. See Nancy S. Ehrenreich, O.J. Simpson & the Myth of Gender/Race Conflict, 67 U.
COLO. L. REV. 931, 932, 940-43 (1996).
ST. THOMASLAWREVIEW
ing to many whites, and the justice system is still dominated by whites.,"
African-American women are often seen, not only as unreliable as victims
or witnesses, but also as "less cooperative" with law enforcement and less
articulate. 69 If they are angry as well, they may fail the "test" of "true"
victims. African-American women already have reason to be mistrustful
of a criminal justice system that disproportionately affects the African-
American community and African-American men.170 The punitive history
of oppression, lynching, and harsh treatment by a white-dominated legal
system and the damage that system has done to the African-American
communities in this country is neither distant nor unreal.' 7' To concentrate
on revenge and punishment may isolate the victim and create a cruel di-
lemma for her by demanding she choose between her rage and her com-
munity."
But what of the argument that the failure of women to get angry or be
motivated by revenge is a result of having been subordinated in this cul-
ture? As Catharine MacKinnon has argued, women learn to "care" and
"forgive" because what else can an oppressed person do in the face of the
violence of the oppressor?' 73 Murphy argues somewhat similarly that the
rape victim who is not angry, who does not want to retaliate against her
rapist, is basically suffering from false consciousness, as women have been
taught to forgive and accept when they ought to have learned to resent and
resist.'74 Yet, as Joshua Dressler noted in his review of Murphy and
Hampton, this may indicate "'an instance of a male and macho stereotype
that is itself no virtue.""' 75 "It is almost as if Murphy were hard to be ask-
ing, 'Why can't women be more like men, and resent and hate rather than
168. Seeid. at941.
169. See id. at 942; Catherine R. Albiston & Laura Beth Nielsen, Welfare Queens and Other
Fairy Tales: Welfare Reform and Unconstitutional Reproductive Controls, 38 How. L.J. 473,
516-17 (1995).
170. See Ehrenreich, supra note 167, at 941.
171. Seeid. at940-41.
172. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Harm and Punishment: .4 Critique of Emphasis on the Re-
sults of Conduct in the Criminal Law, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1497, 1511-14 (1974). The failure of
the African-American community to support Desiree Washington's rape case against boxer Mi-
chael Tyson is one recent example of the dilemmas Black women face. See Kevin Brown, The
Social Construction of a Rape Victim: Stories of African-American Males about the Rape of
Desiree Washington, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 997, 998 (1992); see also Lynne Henderson, Getting
to Know: Honoring Women in Law and in Fact, 2 TEx. J. WOMEN L. 41, 49-50 (1993).
173. See generally Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections On Sex Equality Under Law, 100
YALE L.J. 1281, 1281-82 (1991).
174. See MURPHY& HAMPTON, supra note 128, at 16-19.
175. Joshua Dressier, Hating Criminals: How Can Something that Feels So Good Be
Wrong?, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1448, 1448-49 (1990).
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forgive?"
' 76
Putting aside pressures to forgive too quickly, the assumption that
anger is the proper, moral, and only response to injustice does not seem to
be descriptively true. As part of his argument for revenge, Solomon
breezily asserts: "Despite volumes of propaganda to the contrary, experi-
ence seems to show that to see oneself as a helpless victim makes one less,
and not more, likely to open one's heart to others.' 77 But one should be
cautious of unsupported statements such as "experience seems to show."
Having been a helpless victim of a terrible crime might indeed lead to bit-
terness, self-pity, and resentment but having had such an experience also
makes it more likely that one can empathize with the suffering of others in
similar situations. 7 Nor is it the "best" response or the definitional one
for complete justice-compassion, as Robert Solomon notes, is also an
important ingredient of a sense of justice and catalyst to action.' 79 Even
sadness, grief, and fear can be catalysts for action to change laws or make
unjust situations more just.
Finally, one can ask if encouraging anger, resentment, and revenge
are empirically helpful to victims. This is a more consequentialist analysis
and arguably irrelevant for a rights theorist. That is, if one has a right to
revenge, it does not matter if it is harmful or not to exercise that right,
anymore than the question of whether viewing violent pornography is
harmful is relevant to whether one has a right to do so. Nevertheless,
when advocating rights in the name of victims, it may be morally irre-
sponsible to ignore the consequences to victims of "giving" them those
rights.80 Thus, the consequentialist question of whether it is good to en-
courage anger, resentment, and revenge is important. While Solomon and
Murphy assume it is good for victims,"' there are reasons to question that
assumption.
Anecdotally, victims who expected that the punishment or even exe-
cution of the offender would bring them relief, satisfaction, gratification,
or an end to the effects of the trauma often find that the effects remain and
176. Id. at 1459.
177. SOLOMON, supra note 136, at 286.
178. See Legality and Empathy, supra note 11, at 1574, 1584.
179. See id. at 225.
180. See Wrongs of Victim's Rights, supra note 15, at 953-55 (proposing "a unifying theory
of the individual experience of victimization as it relates to the individual" and arguing that the
theory, supported by recent research, "indicates that many current victim's rights propos-
als ... may actually be psychologically destructive to the victim").
181. See MuRPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 128, at 16-19; SOLOMON, supra note 136, at 242-
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the "victory" is a Pyrrhic one. Unlike the neat, easy solutions portrayed
daily on television and in movies, moral ambiguity and unaddressed issues
from the trauma frequently remain to haunt the victim. This may be espe-
cially true when the victim has focused all of her or his attention on blam-
ing and punishing the offender rather than confronting her or his own re-
sponsibility for healing from the trauma.
In a commentary by a victim of a violent crime recently published in
The Nation, Bruce Shapiro (a victim of armed robbery) uses a story from
Sister Prejean's book to illustrate how even an execution in a fairly short
time (as these things go) failed to assuage the rage and grief of a
rape/murder victim's father:
Vernon begins to cry. He just can't get over Faith's death. It hap-
pened 6 years ago, but for him it's like yesterday.... He had walked
away from the execution chamber with his rage satisfied but his heart
empty. No, not even his rage satisfied, because he still wants to see
Robert Willie suffer and he can't reach him anymore. He tries to make
a fist and strike out but the air flows through his fingers.1
82
I do think this vignette is a fitting illustration of the point that rage
and grief do not end simply even with the infliction of the ultimate penalty.
Additionally, if pursuit of that penalty alone determines the survivors'
lives, healing may be hindered. It is true that, without directing anger at
the person who hurt them, individuals might direct their anger inward, fal-
ling into hopelessness and passivity, self-blame and depression. Denying
anger is not healthy, and revenge fantasies can help someone understand
another's responsibility for the wrong done." 3 Further, we should never
dictate to a victim of extreme trauma that she or he should not be so angry
or that they should get over it within a certain amount of time-the process
varies from individual to individual. Yet, neither should we say anger is
the proper response at all times. With a sole focus on anger and blame,
one avoids taking responsibility for oneself or dealing with the other issues
of extreme trauma-mourning, fear, finding meaning, and reconnecting
with others. Indeed, dwelling on rage can make one more likely to be
stuck and helpless. Further, resentment and vengeance can lock one into a
relationship with the offender, ironically giving the offender continuing
control over his victim.
Let me return to the proposed amendment. What does it give to vic-
tims? The focus is on identified offenders and keeping them in custody. It
182. Shapiro, supra note 13, at 19.
183. See, e.g., SOLOMON, supra note 136, at 40-42 ("The desire for vengeance seems to be
an integral aspect of our engagement in life and, more morally, in our recognition of evil.").
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does nothing for those injured by someone unknown or never caught. The
amendment is grounded in arguments that an individual's feelings of ha-
tred and revenge are proper justifications for the state to punish or im-
prison. Arguably, by allowing victims to oppose the release of suspected
or convicted assailants, 184 the amendment also demonstrates respect for
the fear that victims may feel.
The problem of the criminal justice system's perceived and actual in-
sensitivity to victims remains largely unaddressed by the amendment.'
The insensitivity of which many victims' groups complain is less a consti-
tutional failing than a failing of common decency by actors in the system,
together with the sensitivity to hurt and betrayal victims of violence often
have in the aftermath of an extreme trauma. 8 6 No general law can sensi-
tively address or provide nuanced responses to all the issues of trauma, of
course. Yet, research may suggest that how victims are treated by actors in
the criminal justice process is as important, if not more important, than the
particular outcome or results. Thus, brisk treatment, inadequate informa-
tion, being herded around crowded courtroom halls, having no one return
phone calls, and having no one explain things can lead to feelings of al-
ienation and betrayal by the various actors in the system.
Being treated seriously and sensitively by police and prosecutors may
be more helpful to victims than anything else. For example, a study of the
effects of rape reform legislation in Michigan found that, while there were
only slight improvements in the types of cases that were successfully
prosecuted, victims reported a better experience with the process than be-
fore, because police and prosecutors took them more seriously.8 7 We ob-
viously need more empirical studies of what works and what does not to
help victims; these studies should include victims who are not members of
advocacy groups with a particular point of view, and they should include
those who have had good experiences with the "system."
Bruce Shapiro states that "all survivors of crime have an immediate
184. See S.J. Res. 6, 105th Cong. § 1(1997).
185. See A Proposed Constitutional Amendment to Protect Victims of Crime: Hearing Be-
fore the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 75-82 (1997) (statement of Lynne Hender-
son).
186. See id. (statements of Lynne Henderson and Donna F. Edwards).Some of the earlier
versions did speak of a right to due process and fair treatment for victims. Language that vic-
tims should have a right to be "treated fairly" seems at first blush to be more responsive to vic-
tims' concerns than the current amendment. These provisions dropped out as they -were vague
and raised concerns about interpretation and application. See S.J. Res. 52, 104th Cong. 112
(1996); H.J. Res. 173, 104th Cong. 3, 6 (1996); H.J. Res. 174, 104th Cong. 3, 6 (1996).




and concrete need for medical care, or for lost wages, or for psychotherapy
for themselves and their families, or for legal counsel."'18  I would guess
that victims have these needs and possibly more. Although we lack em-
pirical studies of what the "system" can do to make the experience of vic-
tims better, I have a few common sense thoughts: Generally, funding for,
and commitment to, victim-witness assistance programs, crisis counseling,
victim's compensation programs that help with medical and counseling
expenses, and training for judges, prosecutors, and police working with
victims would undoubtedly help victims.
Victim-witness programs, if well-conceived and well-run, and with
adequate resources, can be of great help to victims, providing both support
and a liaison between the victim and the prosecutor. Victims may need
help with transportation to the district attorney's office or courthouse; they
may need child care as well. There ought to be a safe place where victims
can wait in relative comfort at both the prosecutor's office and the court-
house. A truly good program ought to have qualified social workers to
assist in solving problems, locating good counseling services, applying for
financial aid, and other matters.18 9 Good rape crisis groups, domestic vio-
lence services, and other crisis groups can lend support at a terrible time
and provide effective advice to victims. Victims' compensation funds,
meant to reimburse victims for uninsured losses and medical expenses,
including psychotherapy, can be of great help if they are well-run and
properly funded.
Insensitivity to victims by those who are insiders in the process, such
as prosecutors and judges, is a problem that needs correcting as well;
training programs can help if the participants are willing to attend and
learn. Working with victims is difficult: Not all victims are sympathetic;
not all victims are certain of what they want or need. Victims can be de-
manding and in need of much support, leading prosecutors to resent or
avoid them. Judges may find victims time-consuming, "too emotional,"
uncooperative, flighty, or otherwise difficult.'90 It is easy to be nice to a
cooperative and attractive victim. It is harder to be courteous to an impa-
tient, angry, or somehow uncooperative victim when trying to move a
188. See Shapiro, supra note 13, at 19.
189. See CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND THE VICTIM 177-82 (William F. McDonald ed., 1976)
[hereinafter CRIMINAL JUSTICE]; see also A Proposed Constitutional Amendment to Protect Vic-
tims of Crime: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 75-82 (1997)
(statements of Donna F. Edwards and Lynne Henderson).
190. See CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 189; see also Andrew J. Karmen, Who's Against
Victims' Rights? The Nature of the Opposition to Pro-Victims Initiatives in Criminal Justice, 8
ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT 157, 160-61 (1992).
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heavy case calendar along. Police, prosecutors, and judges also might hold
unconscious or conscious biases against victims of particular crimes such
as rape or relationship violence, as well as victims who are members of a
certain class or ethnic group.
Prosecutors might see themselves in the role of rescuers-at least for
victims who in some way touch or appeal to them. This is dangerous for
both victims and prosecutors, however, if prosecutors are not trained in
dealing with trauma. They ought not try to be therapists or rescuers, be-
cause they may do more harm than good by violating the victim's bounda-
ries or losing sight of their role. If the prosecutor is a self-styled rescuer
and the victim is not properly grateful, the prosecutor may become angry
with the victim or identify with the perpetrator of the crime, which hinders
the victim's healing and the prosecutor's ability to do her job. This does
not mean that they ought not deal with all victims considerately and re-
spectfully.
Prosecutors and courts also need to be sure there are effective ways
to notify victims about the status of their cases. Notice is not enough;
someone, a victim-witness coordinator or prosecutor, needs to be available
to explain the meaning of proceedings and to prepare the victim-witness.
If we are committed to helping victims of violent crime and wish to
be compassionate towards them, we may very well want to provide a fo-
rum for victims to tell their stories, because it seems one of the needs of
victims is to have someone listen. But the amendment's focus on victims
only having a say regarding custody may very easily prevent the telling of
the story the victim wishes to tell.19' Again, prosecutors may prevent
members of victims' families from testifying against the death penalty in
capital cases, and they are likely to be less than enthusiastic for victims'
pleas for leniency in many other instances. 92 Further, if the victim's voice
can still be ignored, because ultimately the amendment provides no
meaningful remedies for "violations" of the right to participate, it may be
cruel to create the illusion of having a say. Finally, the concerns of crimi-
nal proceedings include those of fairness to defendants, at least in theory,
the public, and the goals of the criminal justice process, many of which
may conflict with the personal wishes and needs of an individual victim.
These concerns include proportionality in sentencing and treating like
cases alike-and while for a victim, the case is unique, even-handedness in
justice means generalizing beyond the individual's interests. Thus, some
other forum than the criminal court may be a better place for victims to tell
191. See S.J. Res. 6, 105th Cong. § 1 (1997).
192. See Karmen, supra note 190, at 161-63.
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their stories and receive support.
The programs and ideas mentioned go directly to helping victims
deal with trauma and its aftermath. Yet, these things cost money, and it is
a lot easier to provide rights, which seem so symbolically powerful. How-
ever, the adoption of vast changes in constitutions does not necessarily
produce "happier" victims. California has adopted two sweeping victims'
rights amendments, Proposition 8, in 1982,93 and Proposition 115, in
1991,194 and yet there is little evidence that victims in California are
"happier" or "feel better" as a result.'95 In fact, there was a large contin-
gent of murder victim's relatives from California at the Senate Hearings in
1997, a few of whom voiced the same complaints and told the same stories
to me as were told by other victims in the past to support the California
amendments.
I hope this Commentary succeeds in suggesting a pause before as-
suming that changing the Constitution or declaring rights for victims of
violent crime is an appropriate or compassionate response to their needs
and interests. I hope that we resist the easy fix of providing meaningless
or even counter-productive rights in the name of victims. We should think
seriously about whether we wish to continue with the cycle of revenge and
punishment, at the cost of compassion for victims and offenders, who are,
after all, also human beings, and we should proceed with caution lest in the
name of compassion we do further harm.
193. CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 28. See also Rachel A. Van Cleave, A Constitution in Conflict:
The Doctrine of Independent State Grounds and the Voter Initiative in California, 21. HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 95, 96-7 (1993).
194. CAL. CoNsT. art. I, §§ 24, 29, 30. See also Van Cleave, supra note 193, at 96-97.
195. See Hank M. Goldberg, Proposition 8: A Prosecutor's Perspective, 23 PAC. L.J. 947,
970-71 (1992); see also Foreword, Letter from Margaret Scully, President of the California
Public Defenders Association, to the Board of Editors of the Pacific Law Journal, 23 PAC. L.J.
1, 1-3 (1992).
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